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What Is A Price Band?
It is a stabilization  mechanism which comprises of fixing  a floor price and  a ceiling price,  between which
it is desired that the importing  cost is maintained.  Stabilization  is  obtained  by increasing  the ad valorem
tariff when the international price falls below the floor price,  and by decreasing  the said tariff,  down  to
zero,  when the price goes up over the ceiling price.  In other words,  the price band  attempts to convert the
tariff into a variable factor which is automatically  adjusted in order to counteract the extreme swings of the
international price.
Effects Of Price Bands
Stabilization  Effect:  The  narrower  the  band,  the  more  stable  the  importing  cost  with  tariff.  The
stabilization effect can be measured by comparing the coefficient  of variation of the importing  cost with
and without band.
Protection  Effect:  The higher the level  of the band, regarding  the  international  price,  the  higher  the
importing cost.  This is because the additional tariffs  increase and the tariff reductions decrease.  This  effect
can be measured by comparing  the average  importing  cost with tariff, before and after the band.
Fiscal Effect:  This is the effect of the band on the State fiscal revenues.  It is equivalent  to the protection
effect.
Objectives Of The Andean System Of Price Bands
To stabilize the importing  cost of a special group of agricultural  and livestock products,  characterized  by
the marked instability of their international  prices, or by the serious distorsions  thereof.
To  achieve  a  stronger  connection  between  the  domestic  prices  of the  importable  products  and  the
international price trends.
Elements Of The Andean System Of Price Bands
The products subject  to the price band mechanism.
The rules to determine the floor  and ceiling prices.
The rules to compute the additional variable duty and the tariff reduction.
A Special  Regime  for the consideration of transition and exception conditions.
The operational procedures  for applying the mechanism.
The rules for tariff concessions to third countries.
183The rules for the donations of subject-to-band-products  received.
The Agricultural and Livestock Council,  as  a mechanism of coordination,  follow-up,  and evaluation
of the System.
Products Subject To The ASPB
The System covers  138 NANDINA  subitems, of which:
13 marker products.
Products whose  international  prices serve as the basis  for the computation  of the bands.
125  derived and substitute products.
Those  products  connected  to  the  marker  products  for  being  substitutes,  capital  goods  or  products
manufactured therefrom.  The System intends to cover only those products whose  inclusion  is essential in
order to avoid deviations  in trade or disbalance  in the effective protection structure.
ASPB:  Related Products
Band  Number of NANDINA  Production Lines
Subitems
White Rice  4
Food Grains
Barley  3
White Corn  2
15 Products
Wheat  6
Yellow Corn  24
Feed and Meat
Cuts of Chicken  4
Pork Meat  8  36 Products
Refined Sugar  11  Sugar
13 Products
Raw Sugar  2
Whole Milk  21  Dairy Products
21  Products
Whole Soy  14  Oleaginous plants and vegetal
oils
Crude Palm  Oil  25
Crude Soy Oil  14  53 Products
TOTAL  138
This includes the subitems which correspond  to the marker  products
184ASPB:  Rules  To Determine  Floor And Ceiling Prices
FLOOR PRICE  =  Average of CIF historic prices - A
fraction of the standard deviation
CEILING PRICE  =  Floor price  + A standard deviation
BAND WIDTH  =  A standard deviation
Computation Of The Cif Historic Price Average
Number of Observations  60 months until October of the last year.
Observed Quotations  FOB  or international Stock Exchange prices
Conversion to current dollars  United  States Consumer's Price Index
Conversion at CIF prices  Freight rates of the marker product and 0,5%
insurance
CIF historic price  average  Arithmetical  average  of the CIF price series  in
constant  dollars
Standard Deviation  Adjustment Factors
0.5  For the bands  of:  soy,  crude soy  oil, crude palm oil, rice,  barley,  white corn, wheat,  cuts
of chicken,  and pork meat.
0.0  For the bands of refined and raw sugar,  and milk.
-0.5  For the band  of yellow corn.
185ASPB:  Rules For The Computation Of Additional Duties And Tariff Reductions
Case  1: Marker Products
Reference  Price Level (RP)*  Additional  Duty (AD) and
Tariff Reduction (TR)**  Formula
Above the ceiling price (CP)  TR  =  (RP - CP) x (1 +  AEC)/RP
Within the band  Not applicable
Below the floor price (FP)  AD  =  (FP - RP) x (1 +  AEC)/RP
* Reference Price (RP) = Fortnightly average of the quotations observed in the reference international
market.
** The numerator  corresponds to the TR and  AD expressed in dollars  per metric ton.  When divided by the
RP, they are expressed in ad valorem terms
Case 2: Related Products
Relation Between the AEC of the Marker  Formula  for the Additional Duty
Product and the AEC of the Related  One  of the Related Product (ADr)
AECrelated  =  AECmarker  AD related  =  ADmarker
AECrelated  >  AECmarker  ADr =  Maximum ADm  x  (AECm /AECr)
and  ADm - (AECr  - AECm )
AEC related  <  AECmarker  ADr =  Minimum ADm x (AECm /AECr)  and
AD m - (AECr - AECm )
The Tariff Reduction of the related products  is equivalent to the tariff reduction of the marker product,  and
cannot  surpass the  AEC of the marker  or of the related product,  the lowest of the two.
186ASPB:  Marker Products And Reference  Markets
Rice Band  White Rice  White  rice with 10%  of split grains. FOB Bangkok,  "trader"  weekly
quotations.  Source: Reuter.
Barley Band  USA N02  FOB Portland,  based on daily  quotations reported by the  USDA. Source:
Brewer's barley  Reuter.
Yellow Corn Band  Yellow corn N°2  FOB Gulf, based on the Chicago Stock Exchange.  Daily  closing
quotations, first place.  Source:  Reuter.
White Corn Band  Yellow corn N°2  FOB Gulf,  based on the Chicago Stock Exchange.  Daily closing
quotations, first place.  Source: Reuter.  These quotations shall be
adjusted by a 1,21 factor, which  is anually adjusted.
Soy Band  USA No 2  FOB Gulf,  based on the daily  closing quotations,  first place,  Chicago
Yellow Soy  Stock Exchange.  Source:  Reuter.
Wheat Band  Hard Red Winter  FOB Gulf, based on the daily closing  quotations,  first place, Kansas
N02 Wheat  Stock Exchange.  Source:  Reuter.
Crude Soy Oil Band  Crude soy oil  FOB Argentina,  based on weekly quotations.  Source: Oil  World.
Crude Palm Oil  Crude palm oil  CIF Rotterdam,  North West Europe,  based on weekly  quotations.
Band  Source:  Oil World.
Refined Sugar Band  Refined sugar  London Stock  Exchange  Contract NO  5,  daily spot quotations,  FOB
London.  Source: Reuter.
Raw Sugar Band  Raw sugar  New  York Stock Exchange  Contract  NO  11,  daily closing  quotations,  first
place.  Source:  Reuter.
Milk Band  Whole  powder  Whole powder  milk without sugar,  FOB monthly  average  prices New
milk without  Zealand.  Source:  Statistics,  New Zealand,  official figures of monthly
sugar  exports in volume and value.
Cuts of Chicken  Chicken  Meat  Historic  prices: Trucklot  daily prices for Grade A Chicken, 2 to 3.5
Band  pounds.  North-east of the United States of America.  Quotations  reported
by Urner Barry  Publications Inc.,  plus internal freight rates of US$
87/MT.
L.Reference prices:  Trucklot daily prices for  leg quarters  in the Nort-east
of the  United States of America.  Quotations  reported by Urner Barry
Publications  Inc.,  plus internal  freight  rates of US$ 87/MT.
Pork Meat Band  Pork meat  Boston Butts,  4-8#,  Central  US FOB Omaha,  Source:  USDA, plus
internal freight rates of US$  110/MT.
187SPECIAL REGIME
A.  EXCEPTION CASES  FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE ASPB
II.  In principle,  Bolivia  is not obliged to  apply the ASPB  in view of the high transport  costs  that it
faces due to  its geographical  location.
III.  The  Member  Countries  shall  be  able  to  limit  the  magnitude  of  the  additional  duties  to  that
necessary for the fulfillment of the commitments  on access  to markets,  within the framework  of
the Ronda de Uruguay  of the GATT (GATT Uruguay Round).
IV.  Peru shall be able to limit the application  of the ASPB to 20 NANDINA  subitems.
V.  Venezuela  shall gradually approach the milk band,  starting at a lower  floor price  than that of the
System (0,5 adjustment factor).
VI.  Colombia and Ecuador shall gradually approach the milk band,  starting at a higher floor price than
that of the System (-0,5 adjustment factor).
VII.  Venezuela  is not obliged to apply the yellow corn band during the first year of the System being
into force,  and shall be able to gradually  approach the Andean band starting the second year (0,125
factor).
VIII.  Venezuela shall gradually approach the pork meat band,  starting at a lower floor price  (1,0 factor).
B.  APPLICATION  OF CORRECTIVE  DUTIES
When  a product  of the  System  is imported  from a  Member  Country  which  applies  to  the  said product
overall levies lower than those applied by the importer Member  Country,  it shall be considered that those
imports  cause  distortions  in  competition  and  disturbances  to  the  domestic production  of the  importer
Member Country.
In these cases,  the importer Member Country shall be able to apply corrective duties to the imports which
come from the exporter Member Country,  as long  as a set of specific conditions  are fulfilled.
188ASPB: Parameters In Force During The  Second Fortnight Of June 1995
189
Marker  CIF Floor Price  CIF Ceiling  Fortnightly  AD  (+)  and
Products  US$/MTCIF  Price US$/MT  Reference  Price  TR (-)
Pork meat  1806  2169  1945  0%
Pork meat(Ven)  1624  1987  1945  0%
Cuts of Chicken  1337  1452  858  67%
Whole milk  2090  2310  2081  1%
Whole  milk  2200  2420  2081  7%
(Col Ecu)
Whole milk(Ven)  1980  '2200  2081  0%
Wheat  164  188  191  -2%
Barley  142  154  159  -4%
Yellow corn  146  156  135  9%
Yellow  ---------
corn(Ven)  __________________  _______
White  corn  154  166  159  0%
White  rice  328  373  278  22%
Whole  soy  263  280  244  9%
Crude soy  oil  479  523  616  -18%
Crude palm oil  401  444  650  -20%
Raw  sugar  282  344  -283  0%
Refined sugar  377  462  410  0 %ASPB:  OPERATIVE ASPECTS
IX.  The Board of the Cartagena Agreement,  technical  agency  of the Andean Group,  announces  the
floor and ceiling prices of each marking product every year, before December  15.
X.  The  floor and ceiling prices have an annual  effectiveness  counted  as from  April  1, every  year.
These prices are updated by adding the last  12 months to the series of historical prices,  excluding
the first 12 months of the  series.
XI.  The  additional  duties  and tariff reductions  are specified  in the  customs schedules  made  by the
Board of the Cartagena Agreement.
XII.  The fortnightly reference prices are computed and reported by the Board to the Member Countries,
during the week following the fortnight on which the said prices are based.
XIII.  The secondary information sources of international prices  could be amended through a Resolution
issued  by  the  Board,  due  to  technical  and  operative  considerations,  upon  the  opinion  of the
Agricultural and Livestock Council.
XIV.  The elements  of the  System (marking  and connected  products,  reference  markets,  rules  for the
computation  of the  band  parameters,  etc.)  can  only  be  amended  by  the  Commission  of the
Cartagena Agreement,  highest legislative agency of the Andean Group.
JOINT NEGOTIATION  OF TARIFF CONCESSIONS  TO THIRD COUNTRIES
XV.  The granting of tariff concessions to third countries,  in which products of the System are  affected,
shall  be  commonly  carried  out  through  the  Decision  of  the  Commission  of  the  Cartagena
Agreement.  The  Ministers  of Agriculture  of the  Member  Countries  shall  recommend  to  the
Commission strategy and procedures  to make progress in the corresponding negotiations.
XVI.  The tariff concessions  granted in favor of third countries prior to the establishment  of the System
shall be  commonly  revised  so  as  to  harmonize  them  and  avoid  price  distortions  which  could
countervene  the objectives of the  System.  For this, the Ministers  of Agriculture  shall make the
necessary recommendations  to the Commission.
XVII.  Until the Commission approves the aforementioned  strategy,  the Member Countries shall be able
to continue the bilateral  negotiations  which they are  currently holding  with third countries,  and
which cover products of the Andean System of Price Bands.  Likewise,  the Member  Countries
shall be able  to keep the tariff concessions  granted until their harmonization  is approved  by the
Commission.
190DONATIONS  OF FOOD PRODUCTS
XVIII.  The donations of food products  shall be administered by the recipient Member  Country,  in such
a way, that  their handling does not distort the sub-regional  exchange.  These donations  shall be
monetarized  at prices  no lower than those of the total import duties  of a recent  regular  import.
XIX.  The aforementioned  does not apply to the donations which exclusively  and directly aim at helping
in catastrophs and similar emergency cases.
THE ANDEAN AGRICULTURAL  AND  LIVESTOCK COUNCIL
The Agricultural  and Livestock Council is formed by the Deputy Ministers or Assistant Secretaries  of the
Ministries of Agriculture  of the Member Countries.  Their main function is to advise  the Commission  and
the Cartagena  Agreement in aspects connected  to agricultural and livestock  integration.  With regard to
the ASPB,  it has the following functions:
XX.  To cooperate  with the Board  in the preparation  of decision proposals  connected to  the Andean
System of Price Bands;
XXI.  To carry out a permanent  follow-up  of the System;  to conduct  evaluations thereof from time to
time;  to  channel the  exchange  of essential  information  among the  Member  Countries  and the
Board;  and,  to  inform  the  agencies  of the  Agreement  about  the  performance  of the  System
semestrally.
XXII.  To cooperate in the appropriate  application  of the common  provisions regarding the System;
XXIII.  To issue decisions on specific matters connected  to the ASPB;
XXIV.  To propose measures to the Commission,  whenever an abnormal behavior is observed  in the floor
levels of the bands.
The  representatives  of  the  sub-regional  agricultural  and  livestock  or  agrobased  industrial  trade
organizations participate  in the Council's  sessions  and have the right to vote.
191ASPB:  RICE PRICE BAND
(Constant US$  of June 1994)
ANALYSIS  OF THE BASIS  PERIOD JULY 1989 - JUNE 1994
Stabilization effect:  -55,86%
Protection effect:  -0,28%
% of under floor  observations  26,67%
% of on band observations  46,67%
% of over ceiling observations  26,67%
ASPB:  BARLEY PRICE BAND
(Constant US$  of June 1994)
ANALYSIS  OF THE BASIS  PERIOD JULY 1989 - JUNE 1994
Stabilization effect:  -53,99%
Protection effect:  0,02%
% of under floor observations  15,00%
% of on band observations  26,67%
% of over  ceiling observations  58,33 %
ASPB:  WHITE CORN PRICE BAND
(Constant US$  of June 1994)
ANALYSIS  OF THE BASIS  PERIOD JULY  1989 - JUNE  1994
Stabilization effect:  -59,03%
Protection effect:  0,03%
% of under floor observations  26,67%
% of on band observations  41,67%
% of over ceiling observations  31,67%
192ASPB:  WHEAT PRICE BAND
(Constant US$  of June 1994)
ANALYSIS  OF THE BASIS  PERIOD JULY 1989 - JUNE  1994
Stabilization effect:  -53,88%
Protection effect:  -0,89%
% of under floor observations  30,00%
% of on band observations  23,33%
% of over ceiling observations  46,67%
ASPB:  YELLOW CORN PRICE BAND
(Constant US$  of June 1994)
ANALYSIS  OF THE BASIS  PERIOD JULY  1989 - JUNE 1994
Stabilization  effect:  -78,98%
Protection effect:  7,97%
% of under floor observations  86,67%
% of on band observations  8,33%
% of over ceiling  observations  5,00%
ASPB:  CHICKEN PRICE BAND
(Constant US$  of June 1994)
ANALYSIS  OF THE BASIS  PERIOD JULY 1989 - JUNE  1994
Stabilization effect:  -100,00%
Protection effect:  54,35%
% of under floor observations  100,00%
% of on band observations  0,00%
% of over ceiling observations  0,00%
193ASPB:  PORK MEAT PRICE BAND
(Constant US$  of June 1994)
ANALYSIS  OF THE BASIS  PERIOD JULY 1989 - JUNE  1994
Stabilization effect:  -47,91%
Protection effect:  0,17%
% of under floor observations  38,33%
% of on band observations  33,33%
% of over ceiling  observations  28,33%
ASPB:  POWDER MILK PRICE BAND
(Constant US$  of June 1994)
ANALYSIS  OF THE BASIS  PERIOD JULY 1989 - JUNE 1994
Stabilization effect:  -60,45%
Protection effect:  2,87%
% of under floor observations  58,33%
% of on band observations  23,33%
% of over ceiling observations  18,33%
ASPB:  REFINED SUGAR  PRICE BAND
(Constant US$  of June 1994)
ANALYSIS  OF THE BASIS  PERIOD JULY 1989 - JUNE 1994
Stabilization  effect:  -56,93%
Protection effect:  5,51%
% of under floor observations  71,67%
% of on band observations  6,67%
% of over ceiling  observations  21,67%
194ASPB:  RAW SUGAR  PRICE BAND
(Constant US$  of June 1994)
ANALYSIS  OF THE BASIS PERIOD JULY 1989 - JUNE  1994
Stabilization  effect:  -61,43%
Protection effect:  4,96%
% of under floor  observations  68,33 %
% of on band observations  11,67%
% of over ceiling observations  20,00%
ASPB:  SOY PRICE BAND
(Constant US$  of June 1994)
ANALYSIS  OF THE BASIS  PERIOD JULY 1989 - JUNE 1994
Stabilization effect:  -52,17%
Protection  effect:  0,08 %
% of under floor observations  35,00%
% of on band observations  31,67%
% of over ceiling observations  33,33%
ASPB:  CRUDE SOY  OIL PRICE BAND
(Constant US$  of June 1994)
ANALYSIS  OF THE BASIS  PERIOD JULY 1989 - JUNE  1994
Stabilization  effect:  -57,34%
Protection effect:  -0,68%
% of under floor observations  35,00%
% of on band observations  36,67%
% of over ceiling  observations  28,33 %
195ASPB:  CRUDE PALM  OIL PRICE BAND
(Constant US$  of June 1994)
ANALYSIS  OF THE BASIS  PERIOD JULY 1989 - JUNE  1994
Stabilization  effect:  55,93%
Protection effect:  0,15%
% of under floor observations  28,33 %
% of on band observations  36,67 %
% of over ceiling  observations  35,00%
JUSTIFICATION AND  BENEFITS  OF THE PRICE BANDS
XXV.  The main function of price bands  is to stabillize the import costs of agricultural and
livestock products  affected by strong swings  in their international  prices.
XXVI.  The band is justified since  extreme swings in international prices have undesirable
effects:  higher instability of domestic prices, higher uncertainty for the producers,
instability in domestic production,  higher external  food dependency.
XXVII.  Unstable international  prices are not an appropriate  guide for the  allocation of resources
in agricultural activities,  since they do not reflect changes  in the costs of production.
Food import at depressed prices discourages  the production  of the said food products
and of many substitute products  which may be competitive  at normal prices.
XXVIII.  As a result of the agricultural policies in industrialized  countries  (subsidies to
production and  exports, or border protection to maintain the prices for the producer  or
the agricultural revenues),  the agricultural supply  in these countries  is partially isolated
from the swings in international  prices,  in such a way that they have  lost their orienting
function regarding resource  allocation.
XXIX.  As a consequence  of the said policies,  international prices do not reflect the  real
production  costs in low price trends.  For example,  the export monthly price  of wheat
from the United States has fallen to  110 dollars per ton during the last five years.
However,  the American farmer has obtained a minimum price of approximately  150
dollars,  guaranteed by the State,  throughout that period.  Additionally,  when
Argentinian  wheat is quoted cheaper (it has gone down to 73 dollars),  the US
government provides its exporters  with an additional subsidy  so that they can compete
with the Argentinians.  This policy has frequently caused price-depressive  vicious
circles,  since the Argentinians are obliged to sell at low prices because of the US
subsidies,  and the United  States grants  subsidies because  the Argentinians  sell at low
prices. The same kind of vicious circle tends to take place between the United States
and the European  Union.
196XXX.  The Agreement  on Agriculture of the Uruguay Round represented  a step in the  right
direction.  However,  this step was too  short, considering  the existing distortions.  The
reductions agreed on in tariffs and subsidies are not a significant  change in the current
situation, since many of the said reductions  had already been made.
XXXI.  The price band benefits  not only the importers,  but also the producers  and  the
consumers of the stabilized product.  In fact,  as  a result of the band:
0  The importer benefits,  due to the fact that the import cost is less uncertain since a large
number of the swings  in the international price are counteracted by the automatic
adjustments  of the tariff.  This smaller uncertainty  enables the importer to schedule his
imports more rationally.
O  If the imported good  is a capital good or an intermediate  product, and the importer  is a
processing company,  the band enables  it to project  its production costs with less
uncertainty,  as well as to plan the distribution of its purchases between domestic  capital
goods and foreign capital goods.
O  The importer  and the processer  also benefit since the band implies a  complete freedom
of import,  and substitutes the former mechanisms  of direct and discretionary  control on
imports.  The freedom of choosing what to buy,  from whom, how much,  and when
represents  more benefit opportunities for everybody.
O  The consumers benefit,  since the stabilization of the costs of the importer and the
processer  is expressed  in less unstable sales prices.  Also because the freedom of import
implied by the band system guarantees  a better and more varied supply.
O  The consumers can also benefit from lower prices,  since the monopolistic  revenues
which characterize  the import restriction regimes  disappear.
>  The producers  benefit since the floor price prevents products with extremely  low
prices, non-connected  to production costs,  entering the country.
0  Everybody benefits since the band implies a stronger connection between the domestic
market and the mid-term trends of international prices and the  average level thereof.
S  If everybody seems to benefit from the bands,  who loses?  That depends  on the specific
parameters  of each band.
>  First, the losers are those who obtained  revenues  from the former  system of import
control. In other  words, the former beneficiaries  of the import quotas and licenses,
among them:  some importers,  the bureaucracy  of the importer  state firms, and,
probably,  foreign suppliers.
C>  In a neutral band,  from a fiscal point of view (this is,  if in the mid-term the revenues
from surcharges are compensated by tariff reductions),  the government loses,  since the
higher cost stability for the private sector has to be paid with a higher  instability in the
197fiscal revenues,  regarding the tariffs.  This is a minor cost, since  tariffs  have a
decreasing weight in the structure  of the State's overall  revenues.
0  In a non-neutral  band, from a fiscal point of view, for  example,  if the  government's
revenues for the mechanism overcome  the expenses,  the government  benefits.
Particularly,  the Ministry of Agriculture benefits,  if it is the entity which manages  the
revenues  obtained  from variable  surcharges.  Of course,  the  sectors  to which the
expenditure  of these  resources  is oriented  also benefit.  The losers in this case will
probably  be the aforementioned  agents,  which used  to benefit from the former regime.
0  If the bands are biased  in their design,  there  can be many  losers.
198